Improving transparency of lending to sovereign governments by Olivares-Caminal, R & Mustapha, S
Working paper 583
Key messages
• Transparency of debt terms and conditions is a prerequisite to responsible borrowing and lending, 
and crucial to effective policy decision-making and risk management.
• While sovereign borrowers bear primary responsibility for reporting public debt data, creditors 
must also contribute to ensure that lending is transparent. This is recognised in two creditor-
driven initiatives: the ‘G20 operational guidelines for sustainable financing’ (2017) and the 
Institute for International Finance ‘Voluntary principles for debt transparency’ (2019). 
• The effectiveness of the Guidelines and Principles is undermined, however, by a lack of practical 
guidance for implementing them and monitoring compliance by debtors and creditors.
• Crucial to putting the Guidelines and Principles into practice will be the inclusion of exceptions to 
non-disclosure provisions in debt contracts, allowing the parties to comply with them by disclosing 
key terms and conditions irrespective of confidentiality clauses. This could be enhanced by the 
addition of a disclosure annex.
• Because of the voluntary nature of the Guidelines and Principles, incentivising compliance is crucial. 
This can be done by actively monitoring and publicising those lenders that comply with them.
1 Professor Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Professor of Law at Queen Mary University of London.
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61 Introduction
Transparency of the debts owed by governments 
and the guarantees they have given is an 
important issue for the international community. 
The increasing risk of debt distress in many of the 
world’s poorest countries, coupled with several 
recent cases of inadequate disclosure that put 
macroeconomic stability at risk, have highlighted 
the urgent need to make lending to governments 
more open, particularly the terms and conditions.
The underlying assumption is that more 
disaggregated information on public debt will 
enable borrowers and lenders to make more 
responsible borrowing and lending decisions, 
ultimately making a debt crisis less likely. Better-
quality data can also directly impact sovereign 
ratings and, by extension, lower borrowing costs. 
Furthermore, civil society and parliaments require 
access to the right information in a timely manner 
to hold governments to account, thus facilitating 
good governance and aiding the fight against 
corruption and mismanagement. When debts 
are hidden, the discovery of the potential misuse 
of borrowed funds can lead to a country losing 
market access and/or being cut off from donor 
funding. This can trigger an economic crisis and 
bring about a sovereign default – an event that is 
generally painful for all stakeholders.
Debt transparency is also critical for sound 
policy decision-making and effective risk 
management in the context of the Covid-19 
pandemic. The risk of debt distress needs to be 
closely monitored during these uncertain times, 
given the considerable pressures on governments 
to spend more and the various shocks to 
countries’ capacity to service their debts. 
The international community, therefore, requires 
a firm grasp of the debt numbers, as well as the 
characteristics of that debt, if it is to provide 
timely and appropriate support and avoid a debt 
crisis in some of the poorest, most vulnerable 
countries. In addition, countries seeking to 
access debt-relief initiatives, such as the G20 
time-bound suspension of debt service payments, 
must commit to disclose all public sector financial 
commitments (debt). This is primarily to ensure 
that creditors are sharing the burden fairly and 
to prevent the over-accumulation of new non-
concessional debt (with some exceptions) during 
the suspension period. 
The international financial community has 
actively sought to build the capacity of sovereign 
borrowers to record, monitor and report debt 
data. While some countries have improved 
their debt-recording, monitoring and reporting 
capacity over the last decade, recent cases of 
hidden public debt highlight that much more 
needs to be done (World Bank and IMF, 2018). 
 • In the Republic of the Congo, the state-
owned oil company entered pre-financing 
contracts with oil traders on behalf of the 
government, but these were not reported in 
official debt statistics.
 • In Ecuador, liabilities including advance oil 
sales and short-term treasury certificates, 
worth about 9% of gross domestic product, 
also went unreported in official debt data.
 • In Mozambique, loans to two state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) were fully guaranteed by 
the state, but not included in estimates of the 
public debt stock. 
However, while the sovereign borrower bears 
primary responsibility for reporting public debt 
data, international financial institutions (IFIs) 
and creditors can also play an important role 
in supporting transparency. Several public-
sector initiatives have promoted transparency 
in sovereign debt markets, including the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) sustainable lending 
principles for official export credits (2008; 2018) 
and the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Principles on 
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borrowing’ (2012). The G20 countries endorsed 
the ‘G20 operational guidelines for sustainable 
financing’ in 2017 (G20, 2017), which include 
enhanced information sharing and transparency 
of official bilateral lending to lower-income 
countries. More recently, the Institute of 
International Finance (IIF), a global industry 
association for the world’s largest financial 
institutions, proposed the ‘Voluntary principles 
for debt transparency’ (IIF, 2019). This is 
intended to improve the transparency of private-
sector transactions with lower-income countries. 
These voluntary initiatives, though a step in the 
right direction, will not lead to fully transparent 
accounting of public-sector borrowing for 
reasons we explain in this paper. 
The objective of the paper is to provide readers 
with an understanding of how existing creditor-
driven initiatives to improve the transparency of 
official bilateral and private-sector lending can be 
strengthened and effectively put into practice. We 
focus on the Guidelines and Principles of the G20 
and IIF because of the significant disclosure gaps 
involved in the two types of lending. 
The rest of the paper is structured around the 
following four questions. Chapter 2 answers what 
are the potential benefits of debt transparency to 
various stakeholders. Chapter 3 examines how 
transparent are different types of debt financing. 
Chapter 4 looks at what creditors are doing to 
improve transparency. Chapter 5 recommends how 
these creditor-driven initiatives can be improved so 
that the benefits of transparency are realised. While 
more transparent debt data will not, in and of 
itself, prevent the build-up of an unsustainable debt 
burden, it can help to minimise the risk of debt 
crises and to take timely remedial action when they 
occur. Section 6 concludes with our key take-away 
messages and recommendations. 
82 Transparency for what?
Debt transparency plays a critical role in 
ensuring good lending and borrowing practices. 
Transparency can be understood as making 
information publicly available, so that it is 
accessible to interested stakeholders and the 
wider public. However, the type of information 
matters. Reporting aggregate numbers without 
a detailed breakdown means that users will be 
unable to ascertain whether specific loans are 
included in the total debt figures reported by the 
government in question. In addition to potentially 
‘hidden’ debt, insufficient information on the 
terms and conditions of borrowing can also 
undermine responsible borrowing and lending 
practices (IMF and World Bank, 2018). In the 
rest of this section, we focus on the importance 
of disclosing the specific terms and conditions 
of government financing, including the use of 
government guarantees. This includes, but is 
not limited to, the amount of the financing, fees, 
charges and interest, the intended use of proceeds, 
the payment schedule and collateral requirements. 
First, transparency benefits citizens by 
giving them the information they need to 
hold their government accountable. However, 
more information in the public domain does 
not automatically lead to citizen engagement 
and accountability. It requires civic interest 
and institutions or groups with the capacity 
and space to scrutinise what the government 
does. The type of information provided and 
the level of complexity are also important. 
Meaningful civic engagement requires access to 
information of far greater granularity than what 
is typically published in the national budget or in 
consolidated debt reports. For instance, what is 
a specific loan intended to finance? What are the 
costs of the loan (interest rate and any other fees)? 
How quickly does it have to be repaid and are 
there any triggers for early repayment? What is the 
penalty for not repaying the loan? The more the 
public can answer such questions from publicly 
available data, the more likely it will be that debt 
transparency can serve its purpose of allowing 
independent analysis and enabling greater public 
participation in policy processes. This type of 
public scrutiny may also help deter corrupt and 
fraudulent deals among government officials and 
lenders by increasing the likelihood of detection.
While this type of transparency does not exist 
in the world of corporate finance, a strong case 
can be made for public debt. This is because 
governments have a fiduciary duty to taxpayers, 
who bear the ultimate burden of repaying the 
sovereign’s debt. Moreover, non-transparent 
borrowing can adversely impact the lives of 
citizens, as illustrated by the aforementioned 
Mozambican debt scandal, which involved 
commercial bank lending to three SOEs. As 
described in Box 1, two of the loans were 
undisclosed, while the guarantee of the third 
was a controversial matter. The discovery of this 
‘hidden debt’ caused the country’s economic 
growth to plummet and donors to freeze funding, 
forcing the government to make deep cuts in 
public spending.
Second, creditors and donors also require 
accurate and comprehensive information on 
a borrower’s debt profile to make informed 
decisions when extending financial support. 
Several creditors use the IMF’s formal 
framework for conducting public and external 
debt sustainability analyses (DSAs) to assess a 
country’s capacity to repay its debts and to flag 
any potential fiscal issues (e.g. debt sustainability, 
defaults) the borrowing country may face in 
future. One of the key data inputs into this 
analysis are financing terms (namely, principal, 
interest rate, currency and maturity). Making 
informed lending decisions are challenging if 
creditors are unaware of large parts of a country’s 
debt and the financial terms of that debt.
Third, from a private-investor perspective, 
transparency is crucial for properly pricing 
9sovereign finance and the associated default 
risk. If investors are uncertain about the terms 
and conditions of a substantial portion of a 
country’s total debt, they are likely to adopt a 
prudent approach by increasing risk premia, 
thereby raising the sovereign’s borrowing 
costs. In this regard, numerous studies provide 
evidence of the measurable financial benefits 
of fiscal transparency. Kemoe and Zhan (2018) 
show that fiscal transparency lowers the costs of 
borrowing to the sovereign and increases foreign 
demand for sovereign debt in emerging-market 
and developing countries. Choi and Hashimoto 
(2017) find that data transparency leads to a 
15% decline in the EMBI spread a year after such 
reforms are carried out. Arbatli and Escolano 
(2012) find that fiscal transparency has positive 
and significant effects on countries’ credit ratings. 
Gelos and Wei (2005) provide evidence that 
emerging-market funds systematically invest 
less in less transparent countries. While these 
studies use broad measures of fiscal transparency, 
they suggest that a sovereign borrower that 
willingly discloses the terms and conditions of its 
borrowing is likely to enjoy a higher level of trust 
and confidence among investors, leading to lower 
borrowing costs.
Fourth, the IMF requires reliable and 
comprehensive debt data to detect, prevent 
and resolve debt crises. An important part 
of IMF surveillance involves conducting the 
aforementioned DSA to assess a country’s risk of 
debt distress (in other words, the likelihood that 
a country will experience difficulties in repaying 
its debt) and recommend actions for mitigating 
vulnerabilities. When it comes to the latter, the 
results of the DSA inform the design of adjustment 
programmes, including limits on accumulating 
new debt. Moreover, the recently revised debt 
sustainability framework (IMF, 2018) highlights 
Box 1 Mozambique’s hidden debt
Mozambique’s debt scandal stemmed from three loans incurred by different state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), guaranteed by the central government. The loans were arranged by the 
banks, VTB and Credit Suisse, and included the following financing arrangements: 
 • a $622 million loan to Proindicus to perform coastal surveillance 
 • a $535 million loan to the Mozambique Asset Management Company (MAM) to build and 
maintain shipyards
 • a $850 million loan to Ematum to build a tuna fishing fleet. 
Of the three loans, only that granted to Ematum was publicly disclosed. It was later converted 
into loan participation notes (LPNs), which were traded on the open market. These Ematum 
LPNs were, in turn, legally extinguished in April 2016 through an exchange of the notes 
for $727 million of sovereign Eurobonds issued by the Government of Mozambique, which 
resulted in an entirely new legal obligation (novation). The Ematum LPNs had been discussed 
in various IMF country reports, been included in Mozambique’s public debt statistics, and were 
publicly traded and included in JP Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI). Moreover, 
the subsequent Eurobonds (which extinguished and replaced the LPNs), were a legally distinct 
obligation, fully disclosed to the Mozambique citizenry and approved by the National Assembly, 
in accordance with the country’s constitution and budgetary law.
In contrast, the Proindicus and MAM loans to acquire military equipment for the security 
services and the Ministry of Defence were not publicly disclosed or agreed by the Mozambique 
parliament. These loans were revealed to IMF staff in April–June 2016, triggering an economic 
crisis which brought about a default on all external commercial debt. An independent external 
audit of the loans highlighted inadequacies in the process for incurring the loans and particularly 
in granting of the government guarantees as well as a lack of transparency regarding the use of 
the loan proceeds.
Source: Olivares-Caminal (2019); IMF and World Bank (2018)
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the importance of knowing the purpose of 
borrowing in order to assess whether borrowing 
is being used for productive investments and 
whether it will potentially lead to lower debt 
ratios over time via higher growth, revenue and 
exports. Given that a DSA is only as good as the 
underlying data used, insufficient or inaccurate 
information on the terms and conditions of a 
country’s debt portfolio is likely to impair the 
quality of the IMF’s analysis and advice. 
Lastly, insufficient information on the 
terms and conditions is a problem when it 
comes to crisis resolution. In case of default, 
comprehensive information on a country’s debt 
portfolio is required to assure fair burden sharing 
and an orderly process to manage and exit 
the crisis. Uncertainties about collateralisation 
arrangements, whereby the provision of finance is 
secured against either future commodity exports 
or specific project revenues, can complicate 
the overall resolution process. This is because 
it grants a specific creditor preferential rights 
over specific assets or future flows of funds, 
undermining the positions of other creditors 
and limiting a debtor’s ability to defer paying 
creditors with collateral in a restructuring 
event. This complexity was demonstrated in the 
recent crisis in Chad and the Republic of the 
Congo (Bredenkamp et al., 2020). None of the 
international debt databases collects information 
on the collateralisation features of loans. 
While debt transparency is important as 
a public good, economic actors may have 
legitimate reasons to preserve the confidentiality 
of market-sensitive information. Confidentiality 
may even be in the public interest in some cases. 
Examples of sensitive material information 
include contracts entered into for the purposes of 
hedging risks or those involving national security 
issues. Premature disclosure of information may 
adversely affect market sentiment as well as 
the economy. At the same time, the UNCTAD 
(2019) recommends that any delay in disclosing 
potentially sensitive information should be only 
for the amount of time necessary to further the 
underlying policy objective and should be clearly 
authorised, with the reason for the delay stated. 
Ultimately, demands for greater transparency 
need to be carefully balanced against the need to 
protect sensitive information.
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3 How transparent 
are different types of 
debt financing?
Public debt is an important source of financing 
for sovereign governments. The rapidly evolving 
financing landscape means sovereign borrowers 
have more choice than they did two decades 
ago. In light of the benefits of transparency 
highlighted in the previous section, this section 
assesses the transparency of the terms and 
conditions of the three main categories of debt 
financing currently available to sovereigns: 
1. multilateral lending is financing provided 
by international institutions, such as the 
IMF and World Bank, including regional 
development banks 
2. bilateral sovereign lending is financing 
provided by governments (or governmental 
agencies) to other governments (or 
governmental agencies)
3. private-sector lending is financing mainly in 
the form of commercial bank loans or bonds 
issued in capital markets.
3.1 Multilateral lending
The transparency of multilateral lending is 
generally not seen as problematic due to the high 
degree of accountability and scrutiny imposed 
on multilateral lenders by their own internal 
policies and procedures. In a 2018 survey of 
25 multilateral development banks (MDBs), 
16 had policies on public communication or 
disclosure (Engen and Prizzon, 2018). Many of 
the traditional global and regional MDBs are also 
registered with the International Aid Transparency 
Initiative (IATI) and provide detailed financial and 
non-financial information on projects. Multilateral 
lenders (specifically, the Asian Development Bank, 
the African Development Bank, the World Bank 
International Development Association (IDA) 
and the Inter-American Development Bank) 
also tend to top the Aid Transparency Index, 
outperforming bilateral sovereign lenders (Publish 
What You Fund, 2018). One of the indicators of 
aid transparency assessed in this index relates to 
the publication of loan repayment conditions or 
special terms and conditions.
The terms and conditions of the largest 
MDBs tend to be publicly available, with 
fairly standardised terms for specific groups of 
countries, based on a transparent set of criteria. 
The World Bank’s lending terms, for example, 
depend on whether a country is classified as 
an IDA, International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) or ‘Blend’ country. 
Similarly, the African Development Bank Group 
and Asian Development Bank offer differentiated 
financing terms to specific groups of countries.
3.2 Bilateral sovereign lending
Bilateral sovereign lending presents serious 
concerns from a transparency standpoint. Bilateral 
loans are negotiated at governmental level and, in 
some instances, their purpose may be geopolitical. 
As a result, they are not always fully disclosed to 
the public or IFIs, such as the IMF. 
In sovereign bilateral lending, it is also 
important to distinguish who grants the loan, 
for example, Paris Club or non-Paris Club 
bilateral lenders. The former is an informal 
group of 22 permanent sovereign lenders, 
hosted by the French Treasury, which aims to 
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coordinate solutions to the payment difficulties 
experienced by debtor countries. Paris Club 
renegotiations are based on a number of clearly 
defined terms and principles, such as solidarity, 
consensus and information sharing, which are 
pre-agreed by creditor countries. This facilitates 
the decision-making process and the conclusion 
of agreements. Moreover, every year, the Paris 
Club publishes the amount of its claims on 
foreign countries (Paris Club, 2019). Most of 
its countries also report detailed information 
on the grants and concessional loans given to 
developing countries for developmental purposes. 
This is publicly accessible from the Creditor 
Reporting System managed by the OECD. 
In contrast, non-Paris Club bilateral lenders 
are rarely part of an established creditor 
coordination and information-sharing group and 
are not necessarily bound by Paris Club terms, 
principles and standard disclosure requirements. 
Consequently, their behaviour is generally 
considered less predictable should a sovereign 
borrower face financial distress. These bilateral 
lenders, particularly China and United Arab 
Emirates, also score lower than the other lenders 
when it comes to overall aid transparency (Publish 
What You Fund, 2018). While there is some 
information on the size and timing of Chinese 
loans from a variety of private and academic 
sources, information on loan terms and conditions 
from the China Development Bank or the Export-
Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank) is 
scarce to non-existent (Hurley et al., 2018). The 
lack of transparency of Chinese lending is an issue 
of concern, as China often lends at market rather 
than concessional terms (with risk premia), over 
shorter maturities and, at times, with collateral 
arrangements that secure repayment through 
commodity export proceeds, in particular, from oil 
(Horn et al., 2019).
3.3 Private-sector lending
There are two broad categories of private-
sector lending: commercial bank debt and 
capital market-issued bonds. These two sources 
of finance can be obtained domestically or 
internationally. 
As bonds allocated to private investors are 
generally publicly listed securities (unless there 
is a tightly held private placement), they tend to 
meet transparency requirements fairly easily due 
to their listing requirements. The requirements 
for international issuance, usually governed 
by English or New York law, are extensive 
and strict. In other words, the key terms and 
conditions are already publicly available; it is a 
matter of collating it. This information is more 
comprehensive and detailed than that required 
under the IIF Transparency Principles, but some 
stakeholders may not know how to find these 
publicly available documents and/or how to 
interpret the provisions therein.
In contrast, commercial loans, by definition, 
are private in nature (despite the fact that the 
borrower is a sovereign), because they are an 
agreement that only extends to the parties 
involved in the loan and involves no market 
disclosure. Therefore, unless there is a domestic 
legal requirement in the borrowing country, these 
tend not to be publicly disclosed. This type of 
financing is at the heart of the IIF Transparency 
Principles, which were, to a certain extent, an 
industry-wide reaction to the Mozambican 
scandal (see Box 1).
Table 1 summarises this chapter, outlining the 
level of transparency of the three main external 
sources of debt financing for sovereigns. We also 
flag which type of financing falls under the two 
transparency-related initiatives discussed in the 
next chapter.
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Table 1 Level of transparency of sovereign financing options
Sovereign financing options Level of 
transparency
Observations G20 Guidelines IIF 
Principles
Multilateral High High degree of transparency due to existing 
policies in place for most MDBs
Bilateral Paris Club Medium* Limited degree of transparency over  
the life of the loan
Information sharing and IMF involvement  
at the restructuring level
✓  
(G20 countries)
Non-Paris Club Low Scope for a degree of secrecy ✓ 
(G20 countries)
Private Loans Low Scope for a degree of secrecy ✓
Bonds High High degree of transparency due to 
listing requirements (exemptions: private 
placements, tightly held)
*Prior to distress, the transparency of Paris Club debt is low, as there is no obligation to disclose bilateral loans. Several countries report 
these at domestic level due to self-imposed practices. In a distress scenario, however, it becomes high, as all Club members share information 
concerning their lending to the distressed debtor.
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4 Creditor-driven 
initiatives for improving 
transparency
As discussed, there are significant information 
gaps when it comes to certain types of bilateral 
sovereign lending and private-sector lending to 
sovereign borrowers. To address shortcomings in 
this area, groups or organisations representing the 
major providers of these types of financing have 
formulated guidelines and principles to foster 
greater transparency. This section summarises 
the salient features and the limitations of the 
two most recent and significant creditor-driven 
initiatives in relation to implementation and 
accountability mechanisms:
 • the ‘G20 Operational guidelines for 
sustainable financing’ (2017) for bilateral 
creditors and their agencies 
 • the IIF ‘Voluntary principles for debt 
transparency’ (2019) for private-sector lending.
4.1 The G20 Guidelines: key 
features and limitations
In March 2017, the G20 countries endorsed 
the ‘G20 operational guidelines for sustainable 
financing’. These Guidelines cover the conduct 
of lenders and borrowers in five areas, one of 
which is information sharing and transparency. 
The G20 group contains the largest Paris Club 
creditors and non-Paris Club creditors, the latter 
including China, India and Saudi Arabia.
With the assistance of the IMF and the World 
Bank, the group then developed a standardised 
diagnostic tool (IMF and World Bank, 2019) to 
allow bilateral creditors and their agencies to 
evaluate their own performance and their level of 
compliance with the Guidelines on a voluntary 
basis. The diagnostic tool classifies their lending 
practices as ‘strong’, ‘sound’ or ‘with room for 
improvement’. ‘Strong’ is the highest standard, 
denoting enhanced sustainable lending practices. 
‘Sound’ describes financing practices that are 
in line with the Guidelines, while ‘with room 
for improvement’ reflects financing practices 
that do not meet the minimum requirements of 
Guideline implementation. 
The key features of the G20 Guidelines on 
information sharing and transparency are 
as follows.
1. They apply to the entire public sector of a 
creditor country, including public agencies, 
central banks, export credit agencies, national 
promotional banks, national development 
banks, SOEs and other entities acting on 
behalf of the government.
2. The creditor shares information on existing 
and new lending. A ‘strong’ practice rating 
requires a government agency to collect and 
publish loan-by-loan information for all of its 
country’s official creditor agencies on a single 
website and update it within three months 
of new lending. A ‘sound’ practice rating 
requires a government’s creditor agencies to 
disclose this detailed information to the IMF 
and World Bank at least on an annual basis.
3. The type of data to be made available include 
(but should not be limited to): the amount of 
the loan, the beneficiary (debtor), the use of 
proceeds, the interest rate, the maturity and 
grace period, the structure of any collateral and 
the amount of collateral provided, if relevant.
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4. The creditor reconciles debt data with 
the borrower at least on an annual basis 
to prevent any operational errors or 
misinterpretation of the agreements that could 
undermine the soundness of the debt data.
5. The creditor refrains from using contractual 
clauses that limit the disclosure of amount, 
terms or other conditions in general (‘strong’) 
or to IFIs specifically (‘sound’).
6. The creditor verifies that lending operations 
are adequately disclosed after the fact 
in the borrowing country’s public debt 
statistics (‘strong’). 
7. The creditor conducts a post-debt-
restructuring data reconciliation (if applicable) 
with the borrower, ensuring accurate reflection 
and public availability of any changed terms 
and conditions in the official debt data.
The Guidelines and corresponding diagnostic 
tool also have limitations, however.
1. While transparency is one of the key 
components of the G20 Guidelines, the 
results of the diagnostic survey for each 
participating country are not publicly 
available. Rather, the IMF and World Bank 
compiled the responses into one report and 
did not attribute any of the findings to any of 
the 20 participants (15 members of the G20 
and 5 non-members). As the Guidelines are 
voluntary, one way of promoting compliance 
would be to make the non-disclosure of 
survey results less palatable to stakeholders, 
so that efforts to limit disclosure raises red 
flags among those involved.
2. The diagnostic tool, as it stands, cannot assess 
all aspects of the Guidelines when it comes 
to transparency and information sharing. 
This includes whether creditors use publicly 
available templates for financing agreements 
and refrain from using confidentiality 
clauses. The absence of a publicly available 
template may be partly down to the need to 
tailor contracts to the requirements of each 
arranging creditor and, indeed, each borrower. 
3. The diagnostic survey cannot assess whether 
the creditor has verified that the loan is 
soundly accounted for in the borrowing 
country’s debt statistics. This is potentially 
problematic, as there is a danger that 
creditors will neglect to improve those areas 
that are not captured by the tool.
4. Public disclosure of terms and conditions 
to the wider public is not measured. 
The distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘sound’ 
practices in the diagnostic tool means the 
G20 Guidelines can be met even if the 
creditor only discloses terms and conditions 
of individual loans to the IMF and the 
World Bank on an annual basis. It is unclear 
whether the IMF and World Bank would 
then make this detailed information available 
to other stakeholders (although it is likely 
that this information will be cross-referenced 
with the data provided during the IMF’s 
Article IV consultations to make sure that the 
information is captured).
5. The lack of consultation/involvement of 
non-G20 countries in the formulation of the 
G20 Guidelines may adversely affect take-up 
by these countries.
4.2 IIF Principles: key features and 
limitations
In response to the discovery of several non-
transparent loans to developing countries, which 
contributed to the deterioration of their debt 
sustainability, the IIF developed the ‘Voluntary 
principles for debt transparency’. This self-policing 
initiative is intended to enhance transparency in 
private-sector lending, particularly to the most 
vulnerable low-income countries. The IIF Principles 
are subject to annual review of their uptake, 
implementation and impact. 
The key features of the Principles are as follows.
1. They are voluntary, so decisions on whether 
lenders adhere to them, and countries borrow 
only from adherents (or not) are up to the 
financial institutions and sovereign borrowers.
2. Although they are relevant to all types of 
financing arrangement, they initially apply 
only to foreign-currency transactions with 
low-income countries that are eligible for 
concessional loans from the IMF (through 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust 
(PRGT)), on the grounds that these countries 
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are regarded as more vulnerable to debt 
sustainability issues (see Annex 1 for a list of 
PRGT countries).
3. The Principles apply to all transactions entered 
into directly (such as loans) or indirectly (such 
as guarantees) by government.
4. They are not intended to apply to financial 
transactions where transparency is already 
good (to publicly traded bonds, for instance, 
as described in Section 3.3).
5. They recommend that certain details of 
the transactions (‘relevant information’) be 
reported to a ‘reporting host’ (to be decided), 
including the identity of key parties (borrower, 
lender, guarantor, agent, etc.), financial terms 
(amount, currency, interest rate, etc.), intended 
use of proceeds, status (ranking, immunities, 
the use of collateral or future flow of funds, 
guarantees, etc.) and dispute resolution options 
(governing law and jurisdiction or other).
6. The onus to report is on the lending 
institution (or agent).
7. The Principles recommend that information 
be made available after a cooling-off period 
of 60–120 days after the date at which the 
funds first move.
Although the development of the IIF Principles 
is widely seen as a step in the right direction 
towards improving sovereign debt transparency, 
there are four potential obstacles that could 
undermine their effectiveness.
1. The Principles explicitly recognise the 
importance of having the proper guidelines 
and tools to enable the ‘relevant information’ 
to be publicly disclosed to the ‘reporting host’. 
However, there is no recommendation on the 
contractual clauses and acknowledgements 
required (from each of the contracting parties, 
including the relevant public sector entity 
counterparty). This omission is understandable, 
due to the variety of forms that the lending 
can take, plus the negotiable nature of lending 
arrangements, which can omit (or include) 
specific clauses. Moreover, the IIF Principles are 
not intended to be a complete action plan or 
roadmap for implementation. It is, therefore, 
crucial that guidelines are included in the 
subsequent implementation memorandum 
to increase the likelihood of the Principles 
being put into practice. In Section 5.1, 
we recommend that the parties agree and 
include a disclosure annex with the ‘relevant 
information’ when entering into a new 
financing arrangement.
2. The interest rate on each transaction is to 
be reported in a range (to be included in a 
disclosure template). This is likely to make 
it difficult to estimate the exact financial 
impact of a loan, especially when it is large. 
This feature, however, is related to issues of 
competition law. 
3. Initially, the Principles will apply to a group 
of low-income countries that “are more likely 
to encounter problems with repayment of 
market-rate financing and ultimately debt 
sustainability” (IIF, 2019). Though they may 
eventually be expanded to more countries, it 
is unclear whether the IIF’s assertion as to the 
likelihood of debt distress is correct. It is also 
possible that the existence of principles that 
apply solely to PRGT-eligible countries may 
create a bias towards lending to countries 
that do not require disclosure. 
4. The host institution that will collect 
and disseminate these data is currently 
unspecified. Although an IFI like the IMF is 
seen as a natural choice, there is the risk of 
a possible, or perceived, conflict of interest 
here, as the IMF, itself, is a major creditor 
to sovereign states. An alternative would be 
to establish an independent, non-creditor 
organisation to monitor and enforce the 
Principles, such as that of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 
Ultimately, despite their shortcomings, 
the guidelines and principles are welcome 
developments, in particular, for acknowledging 
that creditors – both bilateral sovereign 
creditors and private-sector creditors – 
have a responsibility to disclose the terms 
and conditions of their lending to sovereign 
governments. However, there is room 
for improvement. 
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5 How to make 
transparency initiatives 
more effective? 
As currently conceived, the G20 Guidelines 
and IIF Principles both contain major gaps that 
must be addressed for them to be implemented 
effectively. These gaps make it difficult to put 
them into practice and to hold creditors to 
account. This chapter proposes how various 
stakeholders can work together to fill these gaps.
5.1 Carving out an exception 
to confidentiality clauses and/or 
including a disclosure annex
Carving out a limitation in the contract can 
allow the parties to comply with the G20 
Guidelines or IIF Principles and disclose specific 
contractual details, despite the existence of 
confidentiality clauses. 
Legal limitations on the disclosure of 
information in a contract tend to be in the form 
of ad hoc contractual provisions negotiated by 
the borrower and lender(s). Such limitations 
typically originate from a confidentiality and/or 
non-disclosure provision in a financing agreement 
or separate, standalone contract put in place 
for that purpose (see Box 2 for more detail). 
A legal limitation is unlikely to emanate from an 
administrative act, order, decree or law prohibiting 
the disclosure of information on a loan. 
Contractual constraints, however, do not 
have to be an impediment to transparency. 
An important aspect of contractual limitations 
is that these are mutually agreed by the parties. 
Thus, the parties may equally agree to make an 
exception to any limitation and/or to include 
a specific annex on the disclosure of mutually 
agreed information (the ‘relevant information’), 
to ensure that the interests of the parties are 
aligned and to overcome any fear of contravening 
a contractual provision. For avoidance of any 
doubt, a line can be included in the confidentiality 
or non-disclosure clause or agreement referring 
to the G20 Guidelines or IIF Principles. This 
Box 2 Contractual provisions for non-disclosure
Contractual provisions limiting the disclosure of information can generally be grouped into two 
categories: 
1.  Material non-public information, which usually relates to the confidential information held by 
borrower and lender and obtained in relation to loan documentation during the application 
and negotiation phase. Such information is typically used in loan applications to better assess 
the financial condition of the borrower, particularly repayment capacity. 
2. Confidential information, which can include material non-public information, is typically 
identified as ‘confidential’ in the actual loan documentation. This can be broad (‘blanket’) 
or specific. In any event, the documentation always includes certain exceptions, for example, 
should the information become publicly available or be required by a competent authority.
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could be further enhanced by the inclusion of a 
pre-agreed disclosure annex with the ‘relevant 
information’, similar to the current practice for 
public announcements or press releases.
However, if disclosure is legally feasible, but 
not politically desirable to the sovereign borrower, 
these political concerns will probably trump 
the voluntary nature of the G20 Guidelines and 
IIF Principles. 
5.2 Using public disclosure to 
incentivise compliance
Incentivising compliance is critical due to the 
voluntary nature of the G20 Guidelines and 
the IIF Principles. As currently designed, more 
responsible lenders may comply with them, while 
they are ignored by others, so borrowing could 
be skewed toward the latter in countries where 
transparency is most needed. For this reason, the 
non-disclosure of self-assessments that evaluate 
the adherence of the 15 G20 members (covering 
37 lending agencies) and 5 non-members 
(covering 12 agencies) to the G20 Guidelines is 
cause for concern.
Actively monitoring and publicising those 
lenders that are compliant with the Guidelines 
and Principles, as well as those that are not, could 
help to incentivise compliance. This is currently 
the approach of several voluntary transparency-
related initiatives, such as the EITI, which aims to 
improve financial transparency and governance 
in the extractive sectors. A similar approach is 
adopted by the IATI, which publishes a list of the 
organisations, including multilateral and bilateral 
creditors, that are compliant with its data 
standard. Making the results of the diagnostic 
tool for the G20 Guidelines public could be 
helpful in pressuring bilateral sovereign creditors 
to improve their lending practices and actively 
monitor their performance.
Monitoring compliance can be difficult due to 
information asymmetries, however. As lending 
arrangements are private, it is difficult to assess 
whether entities are not reporting, or simply not 
lending. There can be situations where a lender 
is assessed as being fully transparent in reporting 
their transactions, but this may be based only on a 
subset of transactions (while a ‘problematic’ loan 
agreement may be shrouded in a cloak of secrecy).
5.3 Creating a central repository 
for all loan terms and conditions
While it is commendable that these two 
groups of creditors are taking responsibility 
for making their respective lending more 
transparent, there is a risk that the separate sets 
of guidelines and principles will lead to multiple 
databases with fragmented management across 
several institutions. This could undermine 
the accessibility and user-friendliness of the 
databases, while differences in coverage and 
definitions used, as well as the interface itself, 
could hamper data comparisons. Ultimately, the 
end-users of the data may find it challenging to 
extract and analyse publicly available data on 
debt terms and conditions. 
Similar criticism has been levelled in relation 
to the different IMF and World Bank debt 
databases, with one proposed solution being the 
creation of a centralised webpage summarising 
debt information from the various databases by 
country. A possible solution to the terms-and-
conditions conundrum, therefore, is the creation 
of a similar summary page, listing terms and 
conditions by creditor for each borrowing country. 
A more ambitious proposal involves all creditors 
reporting to a central registry (Eurodad, 2019). 
The advantage of this approach would be to 
standardise the data-collection process across the 
different types of creditor, ultimately improving 
the comparability of data. At the same time, this 
raises a new set of risks for the party acting as the 
repository, as it could trigger a potential liability in 
the event of a reporting inaccuracy. The responsible 
organisation would, therefore, need to be properly 
resourced, with robust protocols in place to 
mitigate such risk.
5.4 Expanding the IIF Principles to 
all countries 
Although the IIF Principles are intended to 
apply to all developing countries, as mentioned 
in Section 4.2, the initial priority is 70 PRGT-
eligible countries (see Annex 1). These are the 
poorest member countries of the IMF, with an 
income per capita below a certain threshold and 
no access to the international financial markets 
on a durable or substantial basis. 
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Delaying the expansion of the IIF Principles to 
more countries is problematic for three reasons. 
First, a significant amount of private-sector 
lending that falls under the IIF Principles is to 
countries that are not currently PRGT eligible, 
such as Angola, Ecuador, South Africa and 
Viet Nam. On average, between 2016 and 2018, 
commercial bank lending accounted for roughly 
19% of total public external debt in Angola and 
11% in Viet Nam (World Bank, 2020). Excluding 
bonds, commercial bank lending accounted 
for 34% of total public external debt in South 
Africa over the same period (ibid.). Second, debt 
surprises are not confined to PRGT countries. 
Ecuador, a non-PRGT country, has significantly 
underreported its public debt, according to a 
report by the auditor general (IMF, 2019). Third, 
debt vulnerabilities are on the rise in many 
emerging markets. Some countries are in outright 
default and others facing non-trivial financial 
pressures. If global monetary conditions tighten, 
the burden of debt will grow and rollover 
risks will increase. It is, therefore, important 
to increase the transparency of private-sector 
lending beyond PRGT countries.
5.5 Building capacity for debt data 
transparency and reconciliation on 
the side of sovereign borrower 
Although the G20 and IIF initiatives focus 
on developing norms and procedures for 
improving transparency on the creditors’ side, 
the international community needs to continue 
to build the capacity of sovereign borrowers 
to record and report debt data. Regular data 
reconciliation by the borrower with creditors 
and IFIs is also important, as it can flag when the 
information reported by government authorities 
is incomplete or inaccurate. In this regard, it 
would be a beneficial practice for creditors to 
follow up with the borrower’s debt management 
office to ensure that they have adequately 
recorded the terms in their debt data. 
The existing evidence available suggests that 
there are still significant gaps for low-income and 
lower-middle-income countries when it comes 
to debt recording, monitoring and reporting 
(IMF and World Bank, 2018; Mustapha and 
Prizzon, 2018). Moreover, several recent cases 
of ‘hidden debt’ have seen key government 
stakeholders, such as debt management offices, 
being unaware of certain debt obligations. In 
some cases, ‘hidden’ debt liabilities may be 
deliberate to avoid scrutiny and circumvent the 
approval process, but it can also result from a 
lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of 
various actors, as well as lack of clarity on what 
financing constitutes public debt (as in the case of 
Ecuador) (IMF, 2019). 
Consequently, working with countries to 
develop a strong governance framework, effective 
organisational structure, adequate staff capacity 
and a functional debt-recording system is critical. 
This will require political commitment at the 
highest levels of government. In the absence of this 
commitment, sovereign borrowers may be tempted 
to use different types of financing instrument, such 
as public-private partnerships or central bank 
swaps, to underreport their debt liabilities.
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6 Conclusion
Transparency of debt terms and conditions 
is a prerequisite to responsible borrowing 
and lending. It allows citizens to subject their 
government’s borrowing to greater scrutiny and 
gives lenders more certainty about the repayment 
capacity of the borrowing country. Debt 
transparency has been the subject of particular 
attention recently – not least because public debt 
surprises have been a contributing factor to the 
fiscal messes in which some developing countries 
have found themselves of late (Mozambique 
and South Africa, for instance). In an effort to 
address the limited transparency of certain type 
of bilateral sovereign lending and private-sector 
lending, in 2017, the G20 countries endorsed 
the ‘G20 operational guidelines for sustainable 
financing’, while in 2019, the IIF formulated the 
‘Voluntary principles for debt transparency’. 
Although these two creditor-led initiatives 
are important steps forward, more needs to be 
done, by various stakeholders, to make these 
principles operational and to ensure that creditors 
are accountable. In this paper, we recommend 
the following.
1. The parties to a debt contract should 
agree to make a disclosure exception for 
necessary disclosure requirements and/or to 
include a disclosure annex in the agreement 
to mitigate concerns that confidentiality 
clauses may discourage or circumvent 
compliance. We recommend a disclosure 
annex, as this will already include pre-
approved information and help facilitate 
data reconciliation between borrower 
and creditor.
2. A list of creditors that are compliant with the 
Guidelines and Principles should be published 
annually to incentivise compliance with these 
voluntary codes of conduct. However, we 
concede that the private nature of lending 
arrangements makes it difficult to assess 
whether the reporting is actually taking place 
or, more importantly, taking place on the 
required number of transactions. 
3. A central registry or database of debt terms 
and conditions should be created to prevent 
the development of multiple databases that are 
not easily comparable. 
4. The IIF Principles are currently aimed at a 
specific set of lower-income countries, but 
should be expanded to all developing countries 
and possibly beyond to make transparency 
the norm.
5. While the G20 Guidelines and IIF Principles 
focus on developing creditors’ procedures 
for sharing information, a concerted effort 
is needed to build the debt-recording and 
reporting capacity on the side of the sovereign 
borrower. This will also help the borrower and 
creditor to reconcile their data with each other 
on a regular basis, to ensure that the publicly 
available data is complete and accurate. 
Debt transparency is complex, requiring many 
players to work together to make it a reality. 
Moreover, full compliance with the G20 Guidelines 
and the IIF Principles alone will not curtail 
irresponsible borrowing and lending. A well-
functioning domestic legal system and strong rule of 
law in the borrowing country are critical to curbing 
any criminal activity related to sovereign debt. 
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10. Central African Republic
11. Chad
12. Comoros
13. Republic of the Congo

































47. Papua New Guinea
48. Rwanda
49. Samoa
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